SYLLABUS FOR INFT 944
THE PROCESS OF DISCOVERY AND ITS ENHANCEMENT
IN ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS
By what means do we discover or generate new ideas ? Since antiquity, many learned persons have tried to answer this question; it remains one of the most important, interesting, and difficult of all questions we might ask about our intellectual capabilities. At the simplest level we might say that new ideas are discovered as a result of imaginative reasoning. But what such reasoning involves is anything but obvious. In every context including science and engineering we draw conclusions about phenomena, events, and situations based upon observations we make. Over the centuries philosophers and others have come to recognize that it is one thing to justify or defend a possible conclusion based on evidence but quite another to determine how this possible conclusion and the evidence arose in the first place. There are few if any situations in which possible conclusions and all relevant evidential tests of them are provided for us. Hypotheses, evidence, and arguments connecting them must be discovered by someone.
Rules, canons, or logics for justifying deductive reasoning have been with us since the time of Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Rules for justifying inductive (or probabilistic) reasoning have been more difficult to determine. If the philosopher Hume is correct, we may never have any set of inductive rules that can be defended as being uniquely ideal. On many accounts, imaginative reasoning involves something other than deductive or inductive reasoning. If imaginative reasoning does in fact differ from deduction or induction, does it nevertheless conform to any logic ? On one view, the process of discovery, and the imagination it involves, is a distinctly psychological experience and one that cannot be expected to obey any rules, canons, or logics. But on other views, some quite recently expressed, it is argued that there is method in the apparent madness of discovery and that we do have at least some hope for a logic of discovery. One thing quite apparent is that study of the process of discovery is a compelling enterprise in many different disciplines. Consequently, we have scholarship and recorded experiences concerning discovery and imaginative reasoning that come from many different disciplines. As expected, different views of the process of discovery are provided by different disciplines; this is providential. In studying intellectual processes of the highest order, such as those involved in the discovery of new ideas, we need all the help we can obtain, from whatever source it may come. Different perspectives of imaginative reasoning and discovery each supply uniquely valuable insights. As we will see, help comes from some disciplines whose very existence is not widely recognized.
Not all new ideas deserve to be taken seriously. In grading the adequacy of a new idea, novelty alone is not nearly enough. Many truly novel ideas fail to explain anything, generate no new phenomena, or solve no problems. So we also have to be concerned about the extent to which the process of discovery is also efficient and productive. It is one thing to be able to characterize imaginative thought but quite another to be able to demonstrate how we might exercise our imaginations in more productive ways. In recent years, and in several different disciplines, there has emerged a strong interest in developing methods for providing computer assistance to persons performing discovery-related tasks. Considerable research on this matter is now in progress here at GMU.
As the title of this seminar announces, we will become absorbed not only in studying the process of discovery but also in studying ways in which this process might be enhanced or assisted in engineering and in other contexts. There is no single discipline from which we can obtain a necessary, much less a sufficient, background for study of the process of discovery and the imaginative reasoning it requires. The only major requisite for taking this course is a willingness to consider scholarship and recorded experience from many different disciplines. In our work we will examine discovery-related thoughts of persons whose interests involve philosophy and logic, mathematics, neurophysiology, artificial intelligence, probability, history, psychology, the science of complexity, the study of chaotic processes, the writing of fiction, and semiotics (the study of the signs of nature and their possible meanings). It will be my essential role in this seminar to present discovery-related ideas from this mélange of disciplines in what I hope you will agree is an orderly way. A bit later in this syllabus I will mention what I believe your role should be.
AN ANNOTATED OUTLINE OF TOPICS
I have found it no easy task to decide how best to organize ideas from the vast literature concerning discovery and imaginative reasoning. Here is a selection of topics I believe congenial to the interests of persons who have different theoretical and/or practical objectives in mind as far as study of discovery-related processes are concerned. I have put no time-line on this outline since I cannot now predict how long we will wish to dwell on each of the following topics.
It is said that necessity is the mother of invention; it is also said that curiosity is the mother of science. As we all know, evidence of human inventiveness and curiosity goes back many thousands of years. No study of discovery and imaginative reasoning would be adequate without at least some consideration of human progress in discovery and invention from the earliest ages. The trouble is that this history is now as vast as it is absorbing; we could easily spend several semesters just examining the history of human scientific and technological accomplishments. However, what will absorb us the most, as we proceed through the ages, is what people seem to have thought about the process of discovery in which we are able to generate new ideas that offer potential explanations of phenomena of interest. It happens that developments in mathematics are of particular interest to us. It was believed in earlier times that all new ideas arise from processes similar to those involved in the proof of theorems in mathematics. Many noted mathematicians have been especially interested in the processes of discovery and invention.
A. The Earliest Discoveries in Middle Eastern, Eastern, and Hellenistic Cultures
begin our historical tour of progress in discovery by considering a variety of
accomplishments made in early
B. The "Dark Ages": Were They Dark Everywhere
the demise of
C. The Rise of Experimental Science in the Early European Universities
the rise of the universities in
D. The Beginnings of Modern Science: The Arch of Knowledge
the time of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, there
were some definite ideas about the process of discovery. Using the metaphor of
an "arch of knowledge", we will be able to trace, quite
informatively, how the process of discovery was viewed by the likes of Bacon,
PART II. THEORIES OF DISCOVERY AND IMAGINATIVE REASONING
With one or two earlier exceptions, it was not until the 1800s that some persons began to suspect that, during the process of discovery, there may be forms of reasoning that are neither deductive or inductive. As we know, in deductive reasoning there is no content in a conclusion that is not already contained in premises. Induction involves justifications, based on evidence, of hypotheses already generated or discovered by other means.
A. Discovery vs. Justification: More on the "Arch of Knowledge"
Using the "arch of knowledge" metaphor, we will consider views about the process of discovery as expressed in the very important works of John Herschel, William Whewell, and John Stuart Mill. Both Herschel and Whewell began to think that the generation or discovery of a new idea involves something other than deduction or induction. In the works of these three persons we will encounter a controversy that is still with us today. It is one thing to study how some hypothesis might be justified or defended on the basis of evidence but quite another, or so it seems, to say how this hypothesis and evidence were generated or discovered in the first place. Some persons argue that discovery and justification are made of the same cloth; others disagree.
B. Discovery: A Matter for Philosophers or Psychologists ?
For many years, even quite recently, philosophers seem to have been quite content to relegate the study of discovery to psychologists. The essential ground for such a view is that discovery seems to involve apparently unsystematic processes that cannot be captured by any form of logic we know about. As we will note in a later section, many philosophers now seem to be repenting their earlier disinterest in the process of discovery. Indeed, several contemporary philosophers have recently "migrated" into the field of artificial intelligence and are actively involved in research on computer-based means for the analysis of discovery-related processes.
C. Charles S. Peirce on Abductive Reasoning and the Efficiency of Discovery
It appears that the first person who argued that the discovery of new ideas requires reasoning other than deduction or induction was the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). Peirce coined the term abduction (he also used the terms retroduction or simply hypothesis) to refer to the process by which a new idea is generated. But Peirce was not only concerned about how new ideas are generated or discovered. He was also very much concerned about how we might make the process of discovery efficient. As I noted earlier, not all new ideas lead in productive directions. We will examine Peirce's thoughts on abduction rather carefully since they form perhaps the first attempt to study the process of discovery in a systematic way. In any case, his work has been very influential and has given some persons hope of discovering a logic of discovery. Peirce's thoughts on abductive reasoning and discovery were indeed seminal. But they can also be rather confusing since Peirce was not always precise or consistent in his discussions of abduction or retroduction. There are now some very valuable analyses of Peirce's works that we will examine carefully. From these works we gain additional insight into abductive reasoning and its connection with other forms of reasoning. There are some surprises here. For example, on one account we have the discovery of a new idea described in terms of the modern concept of an inference network.
D. Sherlock Holmes and Abductive Reasoning
A very interesting coincidence is that, at
the same time Peirce was writing on abductive reasoning, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was providing
his fictional character Sherlock Holmes with reasoning skills that sound very
much like Peirce's abduction. Conan Doyle seems to
have been inspired by one of his medical school professors, Dr. Joseph Bell.
E. Semiotics and Abduction: Reading the Signs of Nature
A well-established discipline many of us never hear about is semiotics, the science of signs. The word semiotics stems from the Greek semeiotikos, a word referring to a person, such as a physician, who divines or interprets the meaning of signs. Although interest in the interpretation of signs goes back at least to Aristotle, contemporary semiotics has its roots in the work of Peirce. A sign is traditionally defined by the Latin phrase aliquid stat pro aliqou (something that stands for something else). Observing the signs of nature, we attempt to discover their meaning; here is the connection between semiotics and abduction. One contemporary semiotician, Umberto Eco, has attracted world-wide attention through his novels The Name of the Rose, Foucault's Pendulum, The Island of the Day Before, and recently, Baudelino. One of the required readings in this course is his work with Sebeok: The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce. I regard this work as a feast for anyone interested in imaginative reasoning and discovery.
PART III. WHERE IS FANCY BRED?
Peirce frequently associated abduction with the sudden "flashes of insight" we all experience from time to time while we are attempting to draw conclusions from evidence or are working on problems of various sorts. But Peirce was not very informative about how such insights arise, whether or not they occur to us suddenly. You have certainly had the experience of deliberating on evidence, or working on some problem, when possible hypotheses or possible answers are elusive. So, you set the task aside for a while and later, often while occupied by other matters, a hypothesis or answer suddenly occurs to you. Where did this new hypothesis or possible answer come from? One suggestion, of course, is that your brain/mind was at work on this problem all the while you were doing other things. When it had an answer of some kind to report, it did so regardless of what else you were doing. In the process, you might reflect upon the fact that you were not at all aware of any mental processes that were taking place regarding the task whose possible hypotheses or answers were so elusive. In this section we come face to face with some very difficult matters concerning the mental activities and processes by which new ideas and possible evidential tests of them are generated or discovered. Be assured that all of the matters we discuss in this section have been of concern to persons in all of the sciences, especially in mathematics, physics, and in many other disciplines as well.
A. Insights: Where do They Come From ?
Shakespeare wrote: "Where is fancy bred? Or, in the heart or in the head"? We all expect that fancies, in the form of new ideas, somehow come from our heads. Once we start examining processes that may be going on inside our heads, we immediately encounter a very old issue that is certainly alive today. This issue concerns the distinction, if any, between our minds and our brains. This is sometimes called the mind-body problem. One important element of this issue involves distinctions between conscious and subconscious mental activities. It may come as a surprise to you to learn how many eminent scientists and mathematicians have been and are now vitally concerned about such matters. We might believe that such matters are of interest only to philosophers and psychologists. On several accounts that I will tell you about, explaining how our consciousness arises is reckoned to be the most difficult research problem that can be addressed. In addition, as noted above, many learned persons emphasize the role of our subconscious mental processes during the process of discovery.
B. Methods of Study of Mental Processes
Supposing that discovery and imaginative reasoning are mental activities of some sort: How are they to be investigated? We will examine several different methods that have been employed or are now being employed in various disciplines. Different methods will, of course, be informative in different ways.
C. Mind vs. Brain: Arguments About the Distinction
In discussing intellectual processes such as discovery and imaginative reasoning, arguments about the distinction between mind and brain seem unavoidable. There have been no final answers in these arguments in the last 2500 years. I doubt seriously whether we will be able to supply any during this semester. But there are certainly some very strong advocates of various views that have been taken. Again, be assured that study of this distinction is not an idle distraction. We can easily observe the crucial role of our subconscious in work on problems in which we have a strong vested interest.
D. The "Enchanted Loom": A Bit of Neurophysiology
Persons in various disciplines in which there is interest in the process of discovery do not always talk to each other. When they do talk, sometimes they do not listen very carefully. On some views, we can easily discuss discovery, invention, and other "intelligent" activities without any reference to the work of persons who have made careful studies of the structures and functions of the human brain. I do not happen to be among those persons who argue that neurophysiologists have nothing to tell us about the process of discovery and the origins of insight. In this section we will have a look at what nature has provided that seems to allow us to perform various discovery-related activities. In current jargon, this involves study of the "wetware" of our brains.
E. Neurophysiological Correlates of Discovery
The human brain has been referred to as the very "cathedral of complexity" in the known universe. It seems that the highest level of the "services" or activities in this "cathedral" involves creative, imaginative, or inventive reasoning. Here we have a look at very current research on activities in the brain that might plausibly be associated with the emergence of new insights. The views of several different research activities come together on this matter. In the process, I will provide you with what I regard as very informative work in an emerging area called the science of complexity.
PART IV. SOME MODERN SPINS ON ABDUCTION AND DISCOVERY
In this section we will examine various current views about discovery, abduction, and imaginative reasoning. In particular, we will observe how the term "abduction" has acquired a variety of different meanings in the field of artificial intelligence.
A. Abduction as Inference to the Best Explanation
The word abduction has many meanings; Peirce himself was none too consistent in his use of this term. As some of you may already know, this term has found current employment in various works in artificial intelligence. On some interpretations in AI, abduction is said to be inference to the best explanation. This interpretation goes back at least to John Stuart Mill. There is meaning here which is not reflected in any of Peirce's works on the topic. The word best is troublesome since it mixes justification with discovery. If this interpretation read: inference to a possible explanation, there would be a better correspondence. However, we are all entitled to use words any way we please. In fact, Peirce used the term abductory induction with reference to instances in which discovery and induction seem to be mixed together. As we discuss in a later section, we commonly experience various mixtures of abduction, deduction, and induction.
B. Koestler, Bisociation, and Chaos in Discovery
Another work on your reading list is Arthur Koestler's The Act of Creation. Like Eco, Koestler wrote novels and thought very deeply about imaginative reasoning and discovery. He describes a process he called bisociation, wherein the mind makes leaps from one frame of reference to another. Quite recently, in their work Turbulent Mirror, Briggs and Peat have given an account of bisociation in terms of the theory of chaotic processes. This is fascinating stuff and leads to some very current research on complex phenomena.
C. Any Hope for a Normative Theory of Discovery ?
The work Scientific Discovery: Computational Explorations of the Creative Processes (Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, & Zytkow) attracted attention since it suggested that there might be a logic for discovery, at least within the context of science, that could be implemented by a computer. This work and other computationally-oriented works to be mentioned are held in reverence by Margaret Boden, whose book The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms has also been influential. Other persons in AI and elsewhere argue that there was actually no discovery but only hindsight revealed in the work of Langley et al. et al. Whether a computer can be truly imaginative is a controversial issue at present.
D. Imagination, Creativity, and Invention
These three words are often used synonymously but they may refer to different activities. After an attempt to sort out possible differences among these activities, we will have a look at various studies of the characteristics of persons whose works allow us to label them as being especially imaginative, creative, or inventive. As expected, psychologists have been interested in characteristics of imaginative or creative people. There are several works on behavioral analyses of human imagination and creativity that are especially valuable.
PART V. DISCOVERY IN TIME: INQUIRY, SEARCH, AND HEURISTICS
Most of the previous topics concern the characterization of imaginative reasoning and discovery. It is one thing to characterize these important activities but quite another to discover ways of enhancing the process of discovery. We begin in this section by examining how episodes of discovery are played-out over time and how they all seem to involve the processes of inquiry and search. In some current works, focus is directed more on search than upon inquiry. I believe this to be unfortunate. My own view is that sophisticated search strategies are necessary but not sufficient for productive and efficient discovery. Asking the "right" questions is at least as important as having sophisticated search strategies. Since discovery occurs over time, perhaps we do not yet have on hand (in a searchable data base) information that will eventually lead us to further productive discoveries. Such information we can only be obtained by inquiry, a necessary topic of interest in its own right.
A. Temporal Patterns of Discovery, Justification, and Choice
The word discovery means different things to persons in different contexts. One reason is that they experience different temporal mixtures or cycles of three intellectual activities: discovery, justification, and choice. Stated another way, in different contexts we experience different mixtures or cycles of abductive, deductive, and inductive reasoning together with value assessments if our discovery and justification is a prelude to some eventual decision. Many attempts to provide computer-based assistance to persons facing difficult judgmental and decisional tasks have faltered because it has not been acknowledged that the processes of discovery, justification, and choice are frequently bound together in complex and interesting ways.
B. Time and the Interrogation of Nature
We get lots of information without asking for it. The trouble is that we frequently do not get the information we need. Every day my mailbox is full of information about products in which I have no interest. But it rarely contains information I need in the research I perform. In many cases, of course, we do not even know what information we ought to have in some problem we face. In science, engineering, and in other disciplines we get very little information unless we put questions to nature. Indeed, the process of inquiry is crucial in any episode of discovery. How do we know which questions to ask? Some questions we ask will be foolish or at least unproductive. Some questions will supply useful answers that lead us to ask other questions. The process of inquiry feeds on itself over time; we cannot ask all pertinent questions at once. During discovery we have observations or data in search of hypotheses (explanations) at the same time we have hypotheses in search of data. In short, the process of discovery is bound together with the process of inquiry. We will examine several theories of inquiry, the most notable being that of the logician Jaakko Hintikka and his colleagues. In the work The Sign of Three (Chapters 7 and 8) you will discover that Hintikka believes the allegedly abductive talents of Sherlock Holmes can be better explained by saying that Holmes was simply adept at asking strategically important questions of nature.
C. Search and the Necessity of Heuristics
On some current accounts, the process of discovery amounts to having sophisticated methods for search (of records, files, data bases, etc). But this assumes that all the information we need to have is already at hand. But discovery is usually played-out over time and it will rarely be the case that we have all useful or relevant data at hand. In many situations we only begin to fill up a database through the process of inquiry. But it is certainly true that study of search is a necessary element of discovery (I just don't happen to believe it is also sufficient). Sherlock Holmes tells Watson: "You know my method, it is based on the observation of trifles". During discovery, trifles (or details) accumulate at an often-astonishing rate. In some lucky cases, a single trifle can suggest a hypothesis (or possibility), such as the finding of a fingerprint. In most cases, however, hypotheses are generated (or abduced) from combinations of trifles. The trouble is that the number of trifle combinations increases exponentially with the number of trifles we have. With even a relatively small number of trifles we can readily exceed the capacity of any known or possible computer to select all of their possible combinations. So, we find it absolutely necessary to have some guides or heuristics for deciding what trifle combinations to examine. Peirce made the use of the term "heuristic" central in his thinking.
D. Peirce, Polya, Lakatos, Lenat, and Others on Heuristics.
The word heuristic can be defined as any aid to learning, inquiry, or discovery. There are some very valuable works on heuristics by the persons just mentioned. It will pay us to examine these works rather carefully.
E. Discovery and Theories of Probabilistic Reasoning
We might ordinarily think of probability theories as being concerned only with inductive justification and not discovery. However, I believe there to be discovery-related heuristic merit in each of the current views of probabilistic reasoning we routinely examine in INFT 842; here is the basis for this claim. We ask questions about our evidence in the process of establishing its relevance, credibility, and inferential force. But we also ask questions of our evidence in generating (abducing) new hypotheses and further evidence. Careful examination of the Bayesian, Baconian, and Shafer-Dempster systems of probabilistic reasoning each suggest various kinds of questions we should be asking about and of the evidence we gather.
VI. DISCOVERY AND ITS ENHANCEMENT IN VARIOUS APPLIED CONTEXTS
Having looked at what discovery is and the mental activities it seems to involve, we now ask an important question: can we design various methods for enhancing our ability to perform discovery-related tasks? I believe the answer to this question is: yes. Here are some examples of discovery-related research now underway at GMU. You may easily be able to mention work that is going on elsewhere about which I may have no present awareness.
A. Discovery and the Marshalling of Evidence
years ago my colleague Peter Tillers (Cardozo School
of Law) and I enjoyed the support of the National Science Foundation in
studying ways of enhancing the discovery-related activities of criminal
investigators, auditors, historians, and many others whose work involves the
tasks of generating hypotheses, evidence, and arguments linking them. Our work
rests on a very simple premise that some may regard as too obvious to be
stated. The premise is: How well we
A former graduate student in our INFT doctoral program, Carl Hunt, has generated some truly imaginative ideas for enhancing the important process of marshaling thoughts and evidence. For his doctoral dissertation he designed a system called ABEM [Agent Based Evidence Marshaling] in which evidence items can marshal themselves in the act of suggesting new hypotheses and new lines of inquiry. Carl will tell us about his research and how it employs many concepts from the emerging science of complexity that I mentioned above. I will also tell you about how we are applying our work on evidence marshaling strategies to current concerns regarding homeland security matters.
B. Discovering Software Requirements
As many of you know, we have in IT&E a vibrant research program on the design and development of software systems. One of the most difficult tasks in this area is discovering what a client does or should want a software system to perform. This involves what has become known as Software Requirements Engineering. Several recent doctoral dissertations at GMU have addressed discovery-related issues in software requirements and others are in progress.
C. Abduction and Discovery in the Machine Learning and Inference Laboratory
Professor Ryszard Michalski directs a similarly vibrant research activity in artificial intelligence and related fields. One ongoing project in this laboratory is of special interest since it concerns the idea that learning involves mixtures of deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning. As others have noticed over the years, there seems to be a very intimate connection between inference and learning.
D. Knowledge Discovery in Data Bases
Dr. Larry Kerschberg and his colleagues are involved in yet another vibrant research effort at GMU. This project involves the process of discovering knowledge in databases. As I noted in Section V-C above, "trifles" accumulate very rapidly and we must have better strategies for extracting useful knowledge from massive databases. This project concerns development of strategies for discovering patterns, relationships, and regularities or anomalies in large databases. This is very interesting since, as we discuss in Section II-C, it is argued that a major element in scientific discovery involves finding explanations for anomalies.
E. Engineering Design and Creative Problem Solving
Professor Tomasz Arciszewski is actively involved in the study of ways to enhance design processes in engineering. He considers a wide assortment of techniques, some of which he has developed himself, for solving engineering design problems in imaginative ways. He offers a seminar on these topics in the Department of Urban Systems Engineering [USE 690: Engineering Design and Creative Problem Solving]. I hope Professor Arciszewski will be able to join us, as he has done in the past, to give us his perspectives on imaginative or creative reasoning as they influence engineering design processes. Tom and I have been working together on applications of a very sophisticated evolutionary computation system called Inventor by means of which new and more adequate designs for wind-bracing systems for tall buildings are generated. I was fortunate to be asked to collaborate with Tom and Ken De Jong on this project. I do hope Tom can join us as often as he can. As you will observe, he has some remarkable insights into the processes of discovery and invention.
There is no textbook written for a course such as this one. But there are some very excellent books available to get you started in thinking about discovery and its possible enhancement. My only difficulty has been in making a choice of works I regard as "required". The price of books is larcenous, as we all know. Happily, three of the four books I will list below are in paperback. Here are four books that I will ask you to read. Each of these books provides a different perspective from which to view discovery and imaginative reasoning. In class I will tell you why I have selected these four books in preference to others I might have chosen.
1) Root-Bernstein, R. S. Discovering: Inventing and Solving Problems at the Frontiers of
1991. If you have trouble obtaining this work at our bookstore, you can order it through Amazon.com. Its ISBN Number is: 0735100071. If you have trouble obtaining this work, please let me know.
2) Eco, U., Sebeok, T., The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce, Bloomington, Indiana, University of Indiana Press, 1988 Midland Book (paperback) edition.
3) Koestler, A., The Act of Creation,
4) Hadamard, J. The Psychology of Invention in the
I addition to these books, I will have extensive notes for you on every topic we discuss in class. By means of these notes I hope to bring together, in some semblance of coherent form, the truly diverse literature on discovery and imaginative reasoning. In addition, these notes will contain a large assortment of matters not covered in the books I have asked you to read.
HOW SHALL WE PROCEED ?
Some of you already know of my fondness for what Francis Bacon said about the requisites of scholarship: reading makes us full, discourse makes us ready, and writing makes us accurate. This seminar will contain all three of these ingredients. You will certainly have lots to read. I will provide you with notes on each of the topics listed above. I will have these notes for you before the time at which they are to be discussed in the seminar. My intention is to maximize the time we spend in discourse about these topics. Be prepared to answer questions about matters we will discuss and to bring in your own thoughts about these matters as a result of your experience and/or other reading.
METHOD OF EVALUATION
This being a seminar on imaginative reasoning and discovery, my fondest hope is that your own imagination will be sufficiently stimulated so that you will make a discovery in your own area of research that brings you fame, if not fortune. Failing this, I at least hope your curiosity is sufficiently aroused by a discovery-related topic so that you will be driven to find out more about it from existing literature. The choice of topic is entirely yours provided that it involves the process of discovery and/or imaginative reasoning. If it is possible, depending upon the enrollment, we will allow time in the seminar for you to present your ideas to the class. In any case, at the end of the seminar I will expect to have written evidence of your thoughts on the topic you have chosen. As far as this paper is concerned, here is what you can expect as far as my grading standard is concerned. By the way, these standards are virtually the same as those you will face as far as your doctoral dissertation is concerned.
C = A paper that simply lists what others have found regarding the topic of interest to you. It is not enough to write that A says this and B says that. Such uncritical and unintegrated efforts more closely resemble a high school book report than they do an acceptable graduate paper.
B = A paper that provides a critical and a well-integrated assessment of existing work in the topic you have chosen.
A = A paper that is critical and well-integrated assessment of existing work and, in addition, gives evidence of your having applied your own imagination in extending thought on the topic you have chosen. So, you can look upon an A as representing the same criteria you can expect to be in force as far as your doctoral dissertation is concerned.
WHERE TO FIND YOUR INSTRUCTOR
usually lurk in the vicinity of Room 111-A, Science and Technology II
(703-993-1694). I keep no office hours because you are always welcome at any
time. I also teach in the
FURTHER REFERENCES ON DISCOVERY, INVENTION, AND IMAGINATIVE REASONING
You should regard this reference list as just a "seed" list to get you started. You can find other valuable references in the bibliography of each of the four works mentioned above. I have sorted the following references out in terms of the topics listed above.
Bochner, S., The Role of Mathematics
in the Rise of Science,
Cardwell, D. The Norton History of Technology. W. W. Norton & Co., NY, 1995
Corben, H. C., The Struggle to
Understand: A History of Human Wonder and Discovery,
Cromer, A. Uncommon
Sense: The Heretical Nature of Science.
Dampier, W. C., A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion,
Drake, S. [translator]. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo. Anchor Books, NY, 1957
Dunham, W. Journey Through Genius: The Great Theorems of Mathematics. Penguin Books,
Glenn, J. Scientific Genius: The Twenty Greatest Minds. Crescent Books, NY. 1996
Gould, S. J. [ed]. Henri Poincare, The Value of Science: Essential Writings of Henri Poincare.
Modern Library, NY, 2001 (paperback) [A valuable collection of three of Poincare's most famous works concerning discovery and science. The works are: Science and Hypothesis; The Value of Science; and Science and Method.]
Hall, M. B., The Scientific
Heath, T., A
History of Greek Mathematics, (Two volumes),
James, P., Thorpe, N. Ancient Inventors. NY, Ballantine Books, 1994
Kirby, R., Withington,
S., Darling, A., Kilgour, F. Engineering in History.
Koestler, A., The Sleepwalkers: A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe,
Arkana Books, 1989
Lindberg, D., Science
in the Middle Ages,
Lindberg, D., The Beginnings of
Mason, S., A History of the Sciences, Collier Books, 1962
McClellan, J., Dorn, H. Science and Technology in World History: An Introduction.
Ochoa, G., Corey, M. The Timeline Book of Science. Balantine Books, NY, 1995
Oldroyd, D., The Arch of Knowledge:
An Introductory Study of the History of the Philosophy and Methodology
Resnikoff, H., Wells, R., Mathematics
Sarton, G., Ancient
Science Through the Golden Age of
Sarton, G., A History of Science: Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Centuries BC,
Sivin, N. Science in
Smith, D. E., History
of Mathematics, (Two Volumes),
Teresi, D. Lost Discoveries: The Ancient Roots of Modern Science - From the Babylonians to the Maya.
PART II. THEORIES OF DISCOVERY AND IMAGINATIVE REASONING
A. On Scientific Discovery and Technological Invention:
Bernard, C., An Introduction to the
Study of Experimental Medicince,
Beveridge, W. The Art of Scientific Investigation. Random House, NY. 1957
Binder, D., Bergman, P., Fact Investigation: From Hypothesis to Proof,
West Publishing Co., 1984
Bohm, D., Peat, F. D. Science, Order, and Creativity. Bantam Books, NY. 1987 [paperback]
Brian, D. Genius Talk: Conversations with Nobel Scientists amd Other Luminaries. Plenum
Press, NY, 1995
Brockman, J. The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution. NY Touchstone Books. 1996
Bruner, J. On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand. Belnap
Casti, J. The
Chandrasekhar, S. Truth and Beauty: Aesthetics and Motivations in Science. University of
Changeux, J., Connes, A. Conversations on Mind, Matter, and
Press, 1995 [This interesting work is devoted almost entirely to the question: Is
mathematics discovered or invented]
Darling, D. Equations of Eternity: Speculations on Consciousness, Meaning, and the Mathematical
Rules That Orchestrate the Cosmos. Hyperion, NY, 1993
Dasgupta, S. Technology and Creativity.
Davis, P., Hersh, R. The Mathematical Experience.
Dawkins, R. Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion, and the Appetite for Wonder. Houghton
Farmelo, G. [ed]. It Must be
Beautiful: Great Equations of Modern Science. Granta
Gratzer, W. Eurekas and Euphorias: The
Hanson, N. R., Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science,
Holton, G. Einstein, History, and Other Passions. Addison Wesley, NY, 1996
Holton, G. The Advancement of Science, and Its Burdens.
Huntly, H. E. The Divine
Proportion: A Study in Mathematical Beauty.
Kayzer, W. A Glorious Accident: Understanding Our Place in the Cosmic Puzzle. W. H. Freeman,
King, J. The Art of Mathematics.
Lorimer, D. The Spirit of Science: From Experiment to Experience. Continuum, NY, 1999
Medawar, P. The Threat
and the Glory: Reflections on Science and Scientists.
Press, 1991 [paperback]
Medawar, P. The Strange Case of the Spotted Mice. Oxford University Press, 1996 [paperback]
Peat, F. D. The Blackwinged Night:
Creativity in Nature and Mind. Helix Books,
MA, 2000. [One of the best works I have read recently]
Petroski, H. Invention
by Design: How Engineers Get from Thought to Thing.
Poincare, H., Science
Popper, K., The Logic of
Root-Berstein, R. Root-Bernstein, M. Sparks of Genius: The 13 Thinking Tools of the World's
with the one I have required you to obtain].
Rucker, R. Mind
Tools: The Five Levels of Mathematical Reality. Houghton Mifflin,
Salmon, W., The Foundations of
Salmon, W., Logic, New York, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1984
Schaffner, K. Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine.
Schum, D., The Evidential
Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning,
Sons, 1994 (Chapter 9)
Weiner, N. Invention: The Care and Feeding of Ideas. MIT Press, 1994
Wilson, E. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. Alfred A. Knopf, NY, 1998
Wolpert, L., Richards, A. Passionate Minds: The Inner World of Scientists.
B. On Peirce's Abduction:
Bernstein, R., (ed): Perspectives on Peirce: Critical Essays on Charles Sanders Peirce, Yale
University Press, 1965
Buchler, J., Philosophical
Houser, N., Kloesel, C., [eds]The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosphical Writings, Volume I
Houser, N. The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosphical Writings, Volume 2
Peirce, C. S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, (8 Volumes), Hartshorne, C., Weiss,
P., (eds. Vols 1-6), Burks, A., (ed. Vol. 7-8),
Peirce, C. S., Reasoning
and the Logic of Things:
Rescher, N., Peirce's Philosophy of Science: Critical Studies in His Theory of Induction and the
Schum, D. Species of Abductive Reasoning in Fact Investigation in Law. Cardozo Law Review, Vol.
22, Nos. 5 - 6, July, 2001, pp 1645 - 1681
Tursman, R., Peirce's Theory of Scientific Discovery: A System of Logic Conceived as Semiotic,
Weiner, P., Charles
S. Peirce: Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of
C. On Conan Doyle, Holmes, and
Baring-Gould, W., S., The Annotated Sherlock Holmes, (Two Volumes),
Carr, J., The Life of Sir Arthur
Costello, P., The Real World of
Sherlock Holmes: True Crimes Investigated by Arthur Conan Doyle,
Hall, T., Sherlock
Holmes and His Creator,
Liebow, E., Dr. Joe
Bell: Model for Sherlock Holmes,
D. On Eco and on Semiotics:
Blonsky, M., (ed), On Signs,
Capozzi, R. Reading
Eco: An Anthology.
Deely, J., Basics of
Semiotics, University of
Deely, J., Williams, B., Kruse, F., (eds),Frontiers in Semiotics, Indiana University Press, 1986
Eco, U., A Theory
of Semiotics, University of
Eco, U., The
Name of the Rose,
Eco, U., Foucault's
Haft, A., White, J., White, R., The Key to the Name of the Rose,
Ampersand Associates, 1987
Hoopes, J., (ed), Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce, University
Sebeok, T., A Sign is Just a Sign, Indiana University Press, 1991
Sebeok, T., An Introduction to
PART III. WHERE IS FANCY BRED ?
Alkon, D., Memory's Voice: Deciphering the Mind-Brain Code, Harper, 1992
Consciouness, Basil Blackwell, 1989
Cairns-Smith, A. G. Evolving the Mind: On the Origin of Matter and the Origin of Consciousness.
Churchland, P., Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain,
MIT Press, 1993
Churchland, P., Matter and Consciousness, MIT Press, 1993
Cotterill, R. Enchanted
Looms: Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers.
Crick, F., The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientfic Search for the Soul, Charles Scribner's,
Damasio, A., Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, G. P. Putman's
Damasio, A. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace & C0, NY., 1999
Dennett, D., Consciousness Explained, Little, Brown & Co., 1991
Devlin, K. Goodbye Descartes: The End of Logic and the Search for a New Cosmology of the Mind. J. Wiley & Sons, 1997
Eccles, J., The Neurophysiological Basis of Mind,
Eccles, J., Facing Reality, Springer-Verlag, 1970
Eccles, J., The Human Psyche: The Gifford Lectures 1978-9, Routledge, 1992
Eccles, J. How
the Self Controls Its Brain.
Edelman, G., The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciouness,
Basic Books, 1989
Edelman, G., Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind, Basic Books, 1992
Gardner, H., The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution, Basic Books,
Gazzaniga, M., Ivry, G. Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind. W. W. Norton, NY., 1998
Harth, E., The
Llinas, R. R., The Biology of the Brain from Neurons to Networks, W. H. Freeman & Co.,
McCulloch, W., Embodiments of MInd, MIT Press, 1965
McGinn, C., The Problem of Consciousness, Basil Blackwell, 1991
Mountcastle, V. Perceptual
Neuroscience: The Cerebral Cortex.
Nadeau, R., Kafatos, M. The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters of Mind.
Norretranders, T. The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size. Viking, NY, 1998
Penrose, R., The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of
Physics, Penguin Books, 1989
Penrose, R., Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness,
Penrose, R. The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind.
Pinker, S. How the Mind
Works. W. W.
Popper, K. Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem.
Popper, K., Eccles, J., The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism.
Priest, S., Theories of the Mind, Houghton-Mifflin, 1991
Searle, J. Minds, Brains, and Science.
Searle, J. The Rediscovery of Mind. MIT Press,
Searle, J. The Mystery of Consciousness. The
Schrodinger, E., My View of the World, Ox Bow Press, 1983
Schrodinger, E., What is Life ?, Mind and Matter, and Autobiographical Sketches,
Scott, A. Stairway
to the Mind: The Controversial New Science of Consciousness.
Shepard, G. Neurobiology.
Thompson, R., The Brain: An Introduction to Neuroscience, W. H. Freeman & Co., 1985
PART IV. SOME MODERN SPINS ON ABDUCTION AND DISCOVERY
Boden, M., Artificial Intelligence in Psychology: Interdisciplinary Essays, MIT Press, 1989
Boden, M. The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms. Basic Books, NY, 1990.
Boden, M. Computer
Models of the Mind,
Boden, M. The
Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence,
Boden, M. (ed), Dimensions of Creativity, MIT Press, 1994
Bohm, D. On Creativity. Routledge,
Broadbent, D., (ed), The Simulation of Human Intelligence, Blackwell, 1993
Brockman, J. ed. Creativity. Touchstone Books, 1993
Briggs, J., and F. D. Peat. Turbulent Mirror: An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the
Science of Wholeness,
Cornwell, J. (ed) Nature's Imagination: The Frontiers of
Csikszentmihalyi, M. Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention. Harper, NY., 1996
de Bono, E., Lateral
Thinking: Creativity Step by Step,
de Bono, E., The
Mechanism of Mind,
Fogler, H., LeBlanc, S. Strategies for Creative Problem Solving. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle
River, NJ, 1995
Grudin, R., The Grace of Great
Things: Creativity and Innovation,
Howe, M. Genius
Kellert, S., In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in Dynamical Systems, University of
Lipton, P., Inference
to the Best Explanation,
Miller, A., Imagery
in Scientific Thought,
Miller, A. Insights
of Genius: Imagery and Creativity in Science and Art.
Neapolitan, R., Probabilistic
Reasoning in Expert Systems: Theory and Algorithms,
Oliver, J., The Incomplete Guide
to the Art of Discovery,
Peng, Y., Reggia, J., A Probabilistic Causal Model for Diagnostic Problem Solving, Parts I and II, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-17, 1987
Perkins, D. The
Roberts, R., Serendipity: Accidental Discoveries in Science, John Wiley & Sons, 1989
Sternberg, R., (ed), The Nature of Creativity: Contemporary
Sternberg, R., Davidson, J. [eds] The Nature
Thagard, P., Computational Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, 1993
Weisberg, R., Creativity: Beyond the Myth of Genius, W. H. Freeman & Co., 1993
Wolpert, L., The Unnatural Nature of Science, Harvard, 1994
PART V. DISCOVERY IN TIME: INQUIRY, SEARCH, AND HEURISTICS
Hintikka, J., The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry,
in: Earman, J., (ed) Inference, Explanations, and Other
Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science,
Hintikka, J., Bachman, J., What If ? : Toward Excellence in Reasoning,
Mayfield Publishing Co., 1991
(eds) Worrall, J., Currie, G.,
(eds) Worrall, J., Currie, G.,
Lenat, D., The Nature of
Sciences Series CIS-12 (SSL-81-1), April, 1981
Lenat, D., EURISKO: A Program That Learns New Heuristics and Domain Concepts, Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 21, 1983, 61-98
Polya, G., Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning Volume I: Induction and Analogy in Mathematics,
Polya, G., Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning Volume II: Patterns of Plausible Reasoning,
Polya, G., How to
Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method,
PART VI. DISCOVERY AND ITS ENHANCEMENT IN VARIOUS APPLIED CONTEXTS
Cercone, N., (ed), Special Issues on Learning and Discovery in Data Bases, IEEE Transactions
on Knowledge and Data Engineering, December, 1993.
de Gennes, P., Badoz, J. Fragile Objects: Soft Matter, Hard Science, and the Thrill of Discovery.
Fayyad, U., Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., Smyth,P., Uthurusamy, R. [eds] Advances in Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining.
Frawley, W., Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., Matheus, C., Knowledge Discovery in Data Bases: An Overview, AI Magazine, Fall, 1992
Matheus, C., Chan, P., Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., Systems for Knowledge Discovery in Data Bases,
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, December, 1993
Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., Frawley, W., Knowledge Discovery in Data Bases,
Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., (ed), Special Issue on Knowledge Discovery in Data Bases and Knowledge
Bases, International Journal of Intelligent Systems, Vol. 7, No. 7, 1992.
Schum, D., Tillers, P., Marshalling Evidence for Adversary Litigation, Cardozo Law Review, Vol.13,
November 1991, 657-704
Schum, D. Marshaling Thoughts and
Evidence During fact Investigation.
Vol. 40, No. 2, 1999, p 401-454
Tillers, P. Schum, D., A Theory of Preliminary Fact Investigation, U. C. Davis Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 4., 1991, 931-1012.
[I will add to this list as we proceed]